ABSTRACT: More than two dozen U.S. anthropologists worked for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during the Second World War. Some anthropologists at the OSS's Research and Analysis Branch analysed information on Japanese culture and tracked shifts in Japanese morale to estimate the best ways of employing psychological warfare. Among the papers produced by these anthropologists was a 1943 'Preliminary Report on Japanese Anthropology' which included the contemplation of biological warfare programmes using anthrax and other weapons of mass destruction on Japanese civilian and military populations. This article summarizes and critiques the roles of American anthropology in designing and opposing various programmes directed against Japanese soldiers and civilians under consideration at the OSS.
The historical intersections of U.S. anthropology and the needs of warfare periodically reveal tensions between the production of anthropological knowledge and the coalescing needs of state. While each war brings its own particular historical contextualization and specific motivations for fighting, the dangers presented by the threats of European fascism and Asian and European totalitarianism provided strong motivations for U.S. anthropologists to contribute their professional skills and talents to the Second World War.
It is generally estimated that half of the U.S.A.'s anthropologists joined the war, contributing their cultural and linguistic skills in agencies such as the Office of War Information, the War Relocation Authority, the Ethnogeographic Board, the OSS, the FBI's Special Intelligence Service or the Office of Naval Intelligence.
1 While U.S. anthropologists have long acknowledged these wartime activities, there are reasons to wonder whether the silence about the range and details of their specific wartime contributions may not betray some ambivalence about the actual activities themselves (Price 2000; 2004 & 2005b . While most of U.S. anthropology's contribution to the Second World War might best be described as mundane-teaching soldiers and staff foreign languages and about other cultures, or developing culture-specific propaganda-some duties and contributions were more directly tied to the lethal aspects of the war than others (Price 1998; 2002) . During the conflict, for example, dozens of U.S. anthropologists worked for the OSS. The OSS was the institutional predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and, like the post-war CIA, its operatives combined intelligence gathering with covert field operations (Smith 1983; Katz 1989; O'Donnell 2004) .
A now declassified document sheds important light on one of the ways in which the OSS attempted to use anthropology to find more efficient ways of killing Japanese soldiers and civilians. This document was authored in September, 1943 , and was part of an intelligence effort to determine if the Japanese were physically different from Caucasian-Americans in ways that could be exploited in warfare. Reports by the OSS Research and Analysis (R&A) Branch were published as classified, typed reports to be circulated only among military and intelligence personnel with the proper clearance. These documents were almost always published without attribution of authorship and the identity of this report's author is unknown. However, the list of experts contacted at the end of the report identifies several anthropologists consulted in this study. The United States' OSS R&A Branch produced a classified, Secret, 'Preliminary Report on Japanese Anthropology' (OSS 1943) . The report attempted to find a tentative answer to OSS R&A Branch Director, Carl Remer's, disturbing question of whether or not there were, 'physical characteristics in which the Japanese differ from others in such a way as to make these differences significant from the point of view of carrying on the war'? (OSS 1943: 1; on Remer, see Janssens 1995: 181) .
The research of Franz Boas and other American anthropologists at Columbia, UCLA, Berkeley and other U.S. universities a generation earlier had already produced substantial anthropological research on the cultural construction race demonstrating that such investigations would probably prove futile, but the needs of warfare suppressed such findings in the hope of discovering some exploitable racial feature. The OSS operatives authoring the report are not identified, but a list of twenty-one scholars consulted (and an additional twentysix identified scholars still to be consulted) for this report indicates the importance and depth of analysis the OSS R&A Branch devoted to this study as the U.S.A. considered using bio- In considering possible biological weaknesses of the Japanese the OSS gathered scholarly materials on four topics, which were organized under the headings of 'Anatomical or Structural; Physiological or Functional; Susceptibility to Disease; Constitutional and Nutritional' (OSS 1943: 1-2) . The anthropologists and others working on this project were explicitly instructed to consider these questions, 'in a-moral and non-ethical terms', with an understanding that, 'if any of the suggestions contained herein are considered for action, all moral and ethical implications will be carefully studied' (OSS 1943: 2) . This simultaneous awareness and suspension of ethical responsibility is disturbing as it clarifies that the OSS R&A division was aware of dire legal, ethical and moral shortcomings of the work they were 'theoretically' contemplating, as they claimed that some other body at another time would carefully consider these monstrous issues. This relegation of authority seems to have eased the mind of this report's author as s/he searched for options that were genocidal at their very base.
The goals of this study are further clarified in a passage detailing what were claimed to be fundamental physical characteristics of the Japanese:
It is common knowledge that anthropologists regard the Japanese as members of the Mongoloid division of mankind, who differ from other Asiatic Mongoloids chiefly by virtue of a long period of insular inbreeding and through intermixture with Ainus in the north and Indonesians in the south. As a group, the Japanese are characterized by yellowish-brown skin coloring, brown eyes, Anthropology and Total Warfare | AiA | 13 coarse, straight, black, head hair, relatively hairless faces and bodies, short stature, broad heads, and fairly wide faces with prominent cheek-bones. Several other miscellaneous anatomical traits may be adduced. For example, the bones of the inner ear are located higher in the head than among other races; the eye orbits are longer; the intestines are lengthier than among Europeans; there are slight racial variations in the laryngeal musculature; they have fewer taste buds on the papillae; the liver is distinctive; and the arterial system differs somewhat from that of Europeans. As far as could be determined the bulk of these characteristics are only of academic interest and unimportant from the viewpoint of this study. (OSS 1943: 2-3) We are left to wonder what would have been the analysis or recommendations if these characteristics had been recognized as being important from the viewpoint of this study.
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The report noted a 'relative frequency of Meckel's intestinal tract which renders it liable to inflammation or ulceration of the peptic type', adding that this defect was more common in Japanese men than women (OSS 1943: 2-3) . Bits of apparently racist analysis crept into the examination of the Japanese medical and physiological literature to the degree that the Japanese were characterized as: having 'less sensitivity to pain', with small body frames that resulted 'in increased efficiency', and in many cases 'taste-blind' (OSS 1943: 3-6) . These claims were presented without verification, leading contemporary readers to wonder if claims such as widespread taste-blindness were based on nothing more than an ethnocentric evaluation of a culture with a predilection for sushi, sashimi and natto.
The OSS wondered if a biological weapon could be developed that would exploit the relative shortness of the average Japanese male. Using data compiled by the bureau of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, the OSS determined that 'Japanese army recruits in 1935 averaged about 5′3″ in height, and weighed only a little over 116 lbs., each; whereas the average height of American soldiers is 5′7 1 /2″ (OSS 1943: 4) . The OSS report claimed that somehow a smaller average body size meant that the Japanese faced increased health risks, while others interpreted this to mean that the Japanese might have 'increased efficiency' (OSS 1943: 4) .
The mysteries of Japanese urine were considered. Claims that Japanese urine had high levels of sodium chloride and low levels of nitrogen were examined, as were claims that the Japanese were less sensitive to pain (OSS 1943: 5) . Gross generalizations of racial metabolism rates were explored, though Dr. P.G. Benedict's finding that 'Oriental races in general have a metabolism somewhat lower than that of Caucasians in the United States' were rejected as a viable generalization (OSS 1943: 7) .
Potential weaknesses in Japanese immune systems were examined with hopes that a shortcoming could be identified and abused in an attack. The report noted the difficulties if not impossibilities of identifying specific 'useful' immunological differences, though differences in opinion were noted. The OSS started from the proposition that 'all human beings are subject to the same ailments, but that the frequency or severity of a given disease may vary from race to race' (OSS 1943: 9) .
In a search for potential defects that could be exploited in the prosecution of the war, a mere record of diseases prevalent in Japan is of little consequence. Far more significant is a detailed knowledge of the principal causes of death among the Japanese; and a review of their vital statistics plainly reveals that they have outstanding weaknesses in their respiratory and gastro-intestinal systems. Thus, tuberculosis, particularly of the pulmonary tract, is the greatest single cause of death; and the morbidity rate is exceptionally high from pneumonia, pleurisy, enteritis, dysentery, and related diseases. (OSS 1943: 10) There was a keen interest in what was reported as the Japanese susceptibility towards bacillary dysentery, and the possible military implication of this condition was suggested by a finding in occupied Poland in which an outbreak of dysentery among troops proved to be disastrous. The report noted that, 'It must not be thought that the Japanese have made no effort to counteract their susceptibility to bacillary dysentery. On the contrary, they have attempted to immunize their armies, [partly] by oral administration of anti-dysenteric tablets containing dried dysentery bacilli' (OSS 1943: 11) . The report considered how the 'Chinese liver fluke' might be spread in the Japanese homeland, bur rejected this possibility because the Japanese had taken past steps to clear their waters of the mollusc intermediary host needed to sustain and pass on this parasite to humans.
The use of anthrax and other biological agents were considered alongside what was known about the specifics of the Japanese physique. The OSS study found that, 'The possibility of spreading infections of various kinds was briefly touched upon, and the conclusion was reached that anthrax bacilli which attack the respiratory tract, a known weak spot in the Japanese body, would probably be the most effective agent' (OSS 1943: 23) . Groups of anthropologists and MDs were consulted and were explicitly asked for forget the ethical or moral issues involved in contemplating biological warfare. For example, During the course of an interview at the Harvard Medical School one of the professors chanced to 'think aloud' on the possibility of introducing some disease among enemy troops that might catch them by surprise, but against which our own troops were well protected. Most ailments caused by flukes or protozoans he dismissed as impractical; plague virus he thought could be introduced by dropping infected mice or rats, possibly by parachute; typhus might be spread by the device of having louse-covered but immune volunteers submit to capture; and ticks infected with Rocky Mountain spotted fever might be released among our opponents, but this would scarcely be effective since the disease is not transmitted from man to man by contagion. The professor then launched into a spontaneous discussion of anthrax, whose introduction he regarded as entirely practical and highly effective, despite the fact that anthrax, too, is not contagious. In his opinion the enemy has no acquired immunity or tolerance for this disease, and if taken by surprise would have no available counteragent. Furthermore, it is possible to raise highly virulent strains of Bacillus anthracis and to spread them widely throughout any enemy concentration, as the spores of the bacillus are virtually indestructible and could even be distributed in bombs. In addition, the effects of anthrax are very rapid and dangerous since the bacilli enter into cuts, or abrasions, prevent wounds from healing, and induce pneumonia. (OSS 1943: 14-15) This report also noted with concern that the downside of unleashing anthrax on Japanese populations was that it could easily spread to livestock, and thus the region hit by such an attack would 'remain dangerous for many years' (OSS 1943: 15) . Indeed, it was the threat of such uncontrolled spread of anthrax that led the OSS report to caution against its use as a weapon against the Japanese, because 'the anthrax bacillus is so potent that its use should not be contemplated unless our own forces and those of our allies can be guaranteed adequate protection. Similar precautions should, of course, be exercised before any disease-causing agent is employed in offensive warfare' (OSS 1943: 15) .
The OSS reported that Harvard anthropologist Earnest A. Hooton advised that the OSS should undertake a 'constitutional study of Japanese prisoners or of native-born males of military age in the relocation centers, [to] yield useful information regarding the weak spots of Japanese physique' (OSS 1943: 17) . Anthropologist Carl Seltzer (of Harvard's Grant Study Staff, which analysed the physiques and constitutions of Harvard undergraduates) recommended means by which a wealth of useful information could be gained by setting a team composed of an MD, physiologist, hygienist, psychometrician, anthropologist, psychologist or sociologist to the task of examining a half-dozen Japanese 'specimens' a day, until about 300 subjects had been examined, looking for desired weaknesses that could exploited in warfare (OSS 1943: 17) .
Fortunately two anthropologists appear in this report on the record as opposing any such efforts. It was reported that, 'There was by no OSS1943: 17) . Even the report's author had 'little faith in the worth of constitutional studies', but he still recommended that specific features of Japanese physiology be considered (OSS 1943: 18) .
Beyond the imagined differences in the 'Japanese race', the OSS also examined potential exploitations to be made of the general collapse of dietary and hygienic stability on the Japanese home front. The OSS report found that, 'Practically all observers seem to agree that the bulk of the Japanese population lives on the ragged edge of dietary efficiency. If their opinions could be scientifically verified it would be of the greatest consequence to our study, since recently acquired knowledge in the field of nutrition, especially concerning the vitamins, shows that these substances are closely related to the hormones in many of their physiological activities including those related to natural resistance and susceptibility' (OSS 1943: 17) . Similar weaknesses among field soldiers were considered for possible attack:
It has long been recognized that those who live chiefly on highly polished rice get insufficient Vitamin B and are apt to develop beri-beri; and there is a widespread belief in some quarters that the use of slightly polished or unpolished rice has practically eliminated this disease from Japan. This is by no means the case, for there is a strong likelihood that the term beri-beri is loosely applied to a number of deficiency diseases, and that many of them are actually caused by a lack of Vitamin A or of protein, as well as by insufficient Vitamin B. (OSS 1943: 19) This situation suggested to the OSS that beriberi might be an effective weapon against the Japanese, especially as conditions of stress, malnourishment and exhaustion could exacerbate the incidence of the deficiency disorder and intensify symptoms.
The susceptibility of Japanese men of military age, especially under the strain of active warfare, to [beriberi] should be exploited to the full. Of course, it must be constantly borne in mind that under army supervision soldiers can be fed on diets that provide them with a fair degree of protection, regardless of what they customarily eat at home. Unquestionably, the rice which is served in the army is not deprived of vitamins; and the fighting forces are reported to be using a fish paste which utilizes every part of the animal, including bones, viscera and entrails. Nevertheless, Dr. Lu is firmly convinced that the diet of the enemy troops provides them only with minimum protection, and it is her sincere belief that Japanese soldiers cannot withstand continuous, exhaustive, physical strain, especially in very hot weather. Dr. Lu further contends that the Chinese have invariably been successful whenever they could keep the enemy on the go, day and night, for periods of over 72 hours. If Dr. Lu's observations can be indisputably verified, they would serve to provide our military strategists with a very valuable piece of knowledge.
Another weakness of the Japanese diet arises from the extreme preference for rice and fish. No other foods, regardless of nutritional considerations, can compete in popular taste with these two staples. Consequently, irreparable physical and psychological damage could be done to the fighting forces and the civilian population, if ways could be found for destroying the sources of these key foods. It is by no means fantastic to assert that a continuing and concerted effort to sink every enemy fishing boat that is sighted, would contribute materially to our military success.
Equally important would be a planned attack on our opponent's rice supplies. Since stored rice tends to lose much of its Vitamin B the Japanese cannot readily build up large reserves, so that our energies should be directed towards the object of destroying growing crops that are about to mature. Furthermore, it would be more rewarding if rice fields in Japan proper were attacked whenever possible as this would force the enemy to rely more and more on imported rice, thus adding materially to his increasing shipping problems.
Several procedures for interfering with rice production may be suggested. Concentrations of rice fields might be subjected to bombing, particularly with missiles that spread laterally and tear up a good deal of ground; irrigating devices should be consistently destroyed; the acid con-centration best suited to growing rice plants should be chemically upset whenever possible; and the introduction of rice-destroying diseases should be seriously considered. (OSS 1943: 20-22) The paper then identified a species of fungi (Sclerotium Oryzae) that attacked Japanese rice varieties in the early years of the twentieth century. This section closes with the proviso that 'the advisability of systematically destroying the enemy's rice plants, as well as his fish supplies, can scarcely be questioned' (OSS 1943: 20) .
The above estimate that 'a continuing and concerted effort to sink every enemy fishing boat that is sighted, would contribute materially to our military success' (OSS 1943: 22) was not an idle observation, as the OSS R&A Branch had already undertaken a 164-page study of Japan's fishing industry (OSS 1942) . This 25 June 1942 OSS report on 'The Fishing Industry of Japan' not only analysed the importance of the fishing industry for Japan, but also specified and mapped the seasonal fishing grounds and provided detailed drawings, blueprints and photographs of the vessels, gear and ports used by Japanese fishermen. At the war's outbreak, the Japanese had the world's largest fishing industry, harvesting over eleven million pounds of sea life annually (with the United States a distant second, taking five million pounds annually) (OSS 1942: 5) . The OSS estimated that the Japanese relied on about 450,000 fishing vessels, of which almost 300,000 were powered without engines (OSS 1942: 38) . While this fishing industry report was a dry inventory of equipment and capacity, the military implications of this work gave the detailed accountings, such as this paragraph on 'Tuna Catchers', implicit targeting overtones:
Of the motorized craft, the approximately 800 bonito and tuna boats are perhaps the most typical. These seaworthy vessels are now frequently all-steel, with wide cruising radii (up to 2000 miles). They carry the large crews necessitated by the angling technique for Scombroids, sometimes fifty and even seventy men. On a threeweek trip 50,000 to 80,000 fish may be taken. Most of the modern tuna boats are equipped with coldstorage apparatus. The vessels range from 100 tons and 250 h.p. to 200 tons and 200 h.p., averaging about ten knots speed. The catch is stowed amidships, and live bait tanks are provided. These boats are common off Taiwan, Hainan, the Philippines, and the Bonins, as well as in tropical waters. They also fish [end 39/start 42: pictures in between] the bonito and tuna grounds off the Pacific Coast of middle Honshu, and can be considered the most abundant Japanese fishing vessels on the high seas. (OSS 1942: 39-42) Thus, an overview of equipment and feeding capacity was also a wartime estimate of how much starvation and damage could be inflicted on the Japanese people with the sinking of single or multiple civilian fishing boats. The report's accompanying photographs and shipbuilding plans served as targeting guides in such operations.
At the conclusion of the 'Preliminary Report on Japanese Anthropology' it was observed that 'the Japanese appear to be more than usually addicted to diseases of the respiratory and gastro-intestinal system; and it has been suggested that the incident of the latter could be significantly increased if the enemy's hygienic arrangements were to be methodically disrupted' (OSS 1943: 22-23 ). Because they could identify 'no significant structural, physiological, or constitutional variations on the part of the Japanese as compared with other races. Attempts to exploit such minor differences as do exist are almost certain to prove futile' (OSS 1943: 23) . The report recommended that there was 'no need of continuing the project in Japanese Anthropology as a permanent feature of the OSS'; instead it was recommended that occasional studies be carried out as needed (OSS 1943: 24) . But, future study was recommended. The report advised that A few experimental studies should be undertaken. No one of these need be unduly expensive, and none should consume a great deal of time or money. Chief among these would be a nutritional analysis of the foods ordinarily Anthropology and Total Warfare | AiA | 17 served to Japanese soldiers in the field. Information on customary menus could be secured by questioning prisoners, and captured enemy supplies could be subjected to biochemical analysis.
It might also prove of great value to keep under careful observation a number of enemy prisoners or native-born Japanese men of military age, while they were being fed a typical army diet and given an average amount of daily exercise. In due time, after they had become adjusted to these conditions, these men could then be made the objects of a modified constitutional study, whose primary purpose would be to determine their span of endurance, and especially their resistance under hot weather conditions to continuous fatigue over a period of more than 72 hours. If it should be found true that the Japanese soldier, under these conditions, is unable to withstand prolonged, exhaustive and unceasing pressure, we would be enabled to plan the strategy of our attacks in such fashion as to bring about the more rapid collapse of the enemy's strength. (OSS 1943: 25-26) The report does not question the legality, morality or advisability of using prisoners of war to try and derive more effective forms of envisioned race-specific killing. No such experiments on Japanese prisoners are known to have occurred, but even the conception of such studies in an 'anthropological' report, in which the majority of consulted anthropologists did not condemn the project outright, betrays a profound disciplinary depravity or weakness of focus.
Conclusions
Contemporary anthropologists can take some small comfort in the knowledge that this project and its recommendations did not lead to the desired genocidal applications against Japanese troops or civilians. But this is a false comfort, based as it was on anthropologists' failure to isolate any genetic strangleholds, rather than on the activation of any moral code that would have prevented them from following through such a possibility. Rudolf Janssens dismissed the significance of this report by concluding that, because he 'did not come across this report in other record collections it was doubtful if others in government learned of this study and its conclusions ' (1995: 182) .
While formal, scientific, ethical guidelines were not codified until the postwar period (or, more specifically, until after the Nuremberg Tribunal specified protocols for informed consent and championed individual responsibilities in genocidal decision-making processes), the anthropologists contributing to this OSS report had arguably strayed into some perverse terrain. However, the fact that Ralph Linton and Harry Shapiro did not need formalized ethical prescriptions to know that it was dubious to hitch anthropology to a project of this kind, which was clearly directed towards racial weapons, suggests that, even without formal prescriptions, there was some awareness that such efforts were inherently wrong.
Even during times of relative peace, ethical considerations about the propriety of anthropological contributions to warfare are controversial. But war creates conditions in which anthropologists seldom hesitate to contribute their skills and, while most applied anthropological work finds anthropologists surrendering some elements of their research to sponsors, when these interactions occur under conditions of warfare, the consequences of abdicating control over research become serious.
Today, many of the U.S. anthropologists calling for renewed contributions by the discipline to the 'war on terror' situate their appeals within the context of glorified but unexamined anthropological contributions to the Second World War. Felix Moos, Montgomery McFate and other contemporary anthropologists hearken back to the glory days of that war, when they beckon anthropologists to join Bush's war on terrorism by applying our craft at the Pentagon, CIA, NSA and Homeland Security (AAA 2005; Glenn 2005; McFate 2005; Price 2005a ). The current lack of detailed understanding of the full range of actions undertaken by anthropologists in the Second World War allows such pro-military and pro-CIA anthropologists to frame their recruitment efforts with uncomplicated but blurry images from a simpler time when all anthropologists did their duty. But, as a more detailed understanding of the full range of what actually occurred when anthropologists fulfilled this past wartime 'duty' emerges, we may find at least as many reasons to oppose as to support current arguments for anthropology to serve the intelligence community, once again, in large numbers. Anthropologists from the U.S. did make important contributions to the Second World War's battles against tyranny, but they were also drawn into less than honourable tasks and, if this 'good war' is to be used as an advertisement for contemporary anthropologists to join war campaigns today and in the future, then the full range of anthropological contributions to the past war must be considered, and the discipline needs to set ethical limits to anthropological contributions in wartime.
The OSS's 'Preliminary Report on Japanese Anthropology' reads as a dated relic from a past war, but the ease with which so many anthropologists and other scholars abandoned their moral and ethical authority to unspecified others underscores why anthropologists need to establish and adhere to clear ethical guidelines limiting their actions. The ethics codes of the American Anthropological Association and the Society for Applied Anthropology currently do not prohibit covert research and, as media and governmental agencies whip up wartime passions while openly (and we can assume covertly) recruiting anthropologists to join the CIA, Homeland Security and other military and intelligence agencies, anthropologists need to critically examine the full range of activities that their predecessors undertook in past wars. While many of these past activities may not raise the stark ethical issues presented in this OSS report on Japanese vulnerabilities, records of such research still should give us good reason to pause today, as anthropologists once again consider adapting their discipline to the needs of war. Cooper (1946) . 2. It is unknown if the individuals listed in Appendix B were eventually contacted by the OSS and consulted for any work that followed this initial study. Given the report's finding that the successful development of effective Japanese-specific bio-weapons was unlikely, it is possible that the project was abandoned and that none of these individuals were contacted. It seems likely that some of the scientists listed would have scoffed at the possibility of developing such weapons. 3. Had this OSS analyst been given access to data on genotypic variation of the type compiled by the contemporary Human Genome Project, it would certainly have been analysed to see if any genetic anomalies could be exploited to kill what was imagined to be Japanese racial stock.
